High court axes 3 key amendments (from Miami Herald)

Refer to a previous post about the concept of neo-vouchers. I wonder if the decision in the article below influences this new era of vouchers. -Dr. Louie F.Rodriguez
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FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
High court axes 3 key amendments
The Florida Supreme Court removed three high-profile constitutional amendments from the November ballot, including one calling for a tax-swap plan.
Posted on Thu, Sep. 04, 2008
BY MARY ELLEN KLAS
meklas@MiamiHerald.com
TALLAHASSEE -- The Florida Supreme Court dealt a blow to a tax revision plan and school vouchers Wednesday, removing from the November ballot three controversial amendments that could have dramatically altered the future of Florida.
In unanimous rulings delivered less than five hours after the court heard oral arguments, the justices rejected Amendments 5, 7 and 9 on grounds they were improperly placed on the November ballot and are misleading to voters.
The amendments were placed directly on the ballot by the Taxation and Budget Reform Commission, a citizens' panel that meets once every 20 years.
Allan Bense, the chairman of the Taxation and Budget Reform Commission, said he hopes a citizens' group will pursue tax reform now that the commission's signature issue has been killed.
''We gave it our best shot,'' he said. ``I thought that was Florida's best chance ever for real tax reform.''
Amendment 5 -- known as the tax-swap amendment -- would have eliminated property taxes that pay for schools, lowering average tax bills by 25 percent and forcing legislators to replace the money with sales and other taxes.
Amendment 7 would have repealed the 100-year-old ban on direct state funding of religious institutions, including religious schools.
And Amendment 9 would have overturned the state Supreme Court decision that invalidated state-paid vouchers for students in failing public schools to attend private schools.
Opponents argued that the amendments were flawed and that voters would be hoodwinked into supporting them for the wrong reasons.
The swift ruling, to be followed later by a written opinion, gives the secretary of state time to remove the proposals from the official ballot by the Friday deadline.
The big winners are the state's teachers union and school boards, which feared the property tax and voucher amendments would erode state education spending and dilute the Legislature's desire to fix public schools.
Broward Teachers Union President Pat Santeramo said he was ''ecstatic'' about the decision: ``Public education will be saved.''
The unions and school boards, along with a coalition of business, healthcare, education and other interest groups, argued that Amendment 5's ballot language was misleading because it implied that schools would be protected indefinitely from budget cuts when in fact the amendment says the Legislature must protect school spending only the year the amendment would take effect -- 2010-11.
''In rejecting the measures, the court backed clear, unambiguous constitutional amendments, not proposals that mask their true meaning,'' said Florida Education Association President Andy Ford.
But Gov. Charlie Crist was ''disappointed the people will not have the opportunity to vote to lower their property taxes,'' said Erin Isaac, Crist's communication's chief.
And former Gov. Jeb Bush, who made private school vouchers a major component of his education reforms, called the ruling ''extremely disappointing'' and said he feared for the fate of other voucher programs that have not faced a legal challenge.
''Now, more than ever, Floridians should have a voice in determining -- not just how much they are taxed -- but how their tax dollars are spent,'' Bush said.
The court ruling followed an animated one-hour session Wednesday morning, in which the justices questioned whether the tax commission exceeded its authority when it voted to place the voucher amendments before voters and whether Amendment 5 was misleading.
Leon County Circuit Court Judge John Cooper first ruled Amendment 5 unconstitutional because of that misleading implication. Wednesday, the high court agreed. Several justices reiterated his reasoning that the title and summary could confuse voters.
'The average person is going to read this and say, `OK, those property taxes are gone, but the state is going to put that same amount of money back into the school system -- I don't have anything to worry about,' '' said Chief Justice Peggy Quince. ``What will put them on notice . . . that this isn't a feature of it?''
Mark Herron, the attorney representing the Florida Association of Realtors and other proponents, argued that the amendment ''doesn't imply or infer'' that the money will be replaced beyond the first year.
Justice Charles Wells disagreed. ''Unfortunately, like I find with some warranties, it's not a lifetime warranty and I don't have any recourse,'' he said.
The chief architect of the proposal, tax commission member John McKay, said Wednesday the proposal was drafted by some of Florida's best legal scholars who know the Legislature rewrites the school budget every year. They decided that specifying that school budgets would be immune from cuts after the first year was not necessary, adding, ``in hindsight, that would have probably been a good idea.''
The high court also agreed with opponents that the Taxation and Budget Reform Commission went beyond its authority when it placed the voucher-related amendments on the ballot. Justice Harry Lee Anstead questioned whether the commission was created to deal with any issue that has budget impact, or if it's limited to those that deal with the budget process. If not, he said, ``they could do anything.''
Bense said the process exposed some problems with the design of the commission, too. The Constitution requires the panel to get 17 of 25 members to place any amendment on the ballot, so proponents were forced to compromise and revise their proposals to get enough votes.
In the end, that may have doomed these three proposals, Bense said. For example, the tax reform amendment was tied to eliminating property taxes to win enough votes to put it on the ballot, but that prompted schools to worry about funding cuts.
''Had it required a majority vote, maybe it would be on the ballot,'' he said.
Miami Herald staff writer Hannah Sampson contributed to this report.

Under the Voucher Radar (from Ed Week)

Something we should keep our eyes on in Florida and the rest of the country, especially since we are in a presidential election year. --Dr. Louie F. Rodriguez
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Education Week
Published Online: August 29, 2008
Published in Print: September 3, 2008
Commentary
Under the Voucher Radar
By Kevin G. Welner
Tuition tax credits for private schools, a policy
increasingly popular among advocates of school choice, present us with several
riddles. When is a charitable donation not charity? When is a public
expenditure not public spending? And what policy can be virtually
indistinguishable from a voucher in its effects, but be treated by courts as
something very different? The answer to this last question, and the key to
answering the first two, is a type of tuition tax credit I call a “neovoucher.”
Traditional vouchers offer parents government funding for tuition at
nonpublic schools. Neovouchers rely on a more complicated, and thus less transparent,
process:
First, a taxpayer donates money to a private, nonprofit organization.
Then that organization bundles the donations and issues them to parents as vouchers
toward tuition at nonpublic schools. Finally, the taxpayer-donor receives some
or all of the donated money back, in the form of a tax credit from the state.
The money thus goes from taxpayer, to nonprofit organization, to
parent, to school. The taxpayer then is reimbursed by the state. This answers
the first riddle. In Arizona, Florida, and Georgia, that reimbursement is 100
percent. The taxpayer’s “charitable donation” is little more than a
reassignment of his or her tax obligation to the neovoucher program. Three
other states have similar programs: Iowa, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island. In those states, the tax credit ranges from
65 percent to 90 percent of the donation—still ample, but leaving some room for
actual charity.
Currently, about twice as many students (approximately 100,000)
receive neovouchers as compared with traditional vouchers. Yet we know very
little about them or what effect they are having on our education system.
Proponents of neovouchers contend that they provide opportunities for
greater academic and life success, particularly for underserved children. This
is a powerful and important claim that deserves to be given a fair evaluation.
Unfortunately, none of the six states with neovoucher laws collects sufficient
information to allow us to evaluate this claim, or to answer a host of other
important questions such as these:
• What are the effects of neovouchers on achievement and competition?
• What are the incomes and ethnicities of the families that receive
neovouchers?
• Does the use of neovouchers produce greater stratification of school
enrollments, or do these vouchers serve to mitigate existing stratification?
• Which schools receive neovouchers? What are the characteristics of
those schools?
• What percentage of neovouchers go to students switching from public
to private school?
• What is the overall effect of neovoucher policies on public
spending?
• Do neovouchers produce demand pressures that increase the supply of
nonpublic schools, increase tuition, or both?
To date, we have at best partial answers to these important questions.
In Arizona,
for instance, there is some evidence that neovouchers are used by wealthier
families with children who already attend private school. Will other states
have different results? Without the data, we simply don’t know.
Neovouchers’ convoluted funding mechanism may be an inefficient way of
allocating tax dollars, but it serves an important legal purpose. Which answers
the second riddle: Since no new money ever actually enters the state’s coffers,
proponents can argue that state money has not been spent on religious
education. This reasoning was adopted by a majority of judges on the Arizona
Supreme Court (Kotterman v. Killian, 1999), in a state that, like
many others, has a constitutional provision forbidding expenditure of public
dollars on religious schools.
The elaborate neovoucher system also serves a political purpose
because traditional vouchers have acquired formidable negative baggage. (In
fact, voucher supporters often attempt to blunt public opposition by inventing
new terms such as “opportunity scholarships.”)
States are embracing
‘neovoucher’ tuition-tax-credit plans without knowing what their long-term
risks or benefits might be.
Beyond these intended effects of neovoucher policies, though, are
other notable policy consequences. The tax-credit process places decisions on
public funding in the hands of only those private citizens who file itemized
tax returns, rather than taking the standardized deduction. Such taxpayers tend
to be a relatively wealthy subset of all taxpayers. Using Arizona data from 2000 to 2004, for example,
I found that those with a taxable income of around $24,000 are about as likely
to file an itemized return as to take the standardized deduction. At $40,000,
they are twice as likely to file an itemized return. That likelihood begins to
escalate sharply at higher income levels. Taxpayers in the bracket from
$100,000 to $199,999 are 24 times more likely to itemize than not.
With traditional vouchers, democratically elected lawmakers decide on
the rules for eligibility, and no part of the private school sector is given
preference over another. Neovouchers, by contrast, permit a subset of taxpayers
to decide which students and schools receive assistance. Each person claiming a
tax credit in effect substitutes his or her spending preferences for those of
an elected legislative body. On the surface, this may seem attractive. But the
public-policy implications are profound.
In Arizona,
schools and students supported by neovouchers have disproportionately been
found in more-affluent neighborhoods. The local “donors” have used the
neovoucher system to effectively help pay for the education of their own
children, an option not available to families who do not file itemized tax
returns or who owe only minimal (or no) state taxes. At a time when most states
are trying to close achievement gaps, Arizona’s
neovoucher program appears to be disproportionately subsidizing the education
of children in its wealthiest families.
Neovoucher plans have had considerable success in avoiding the
controversy and opposition that have plagued other voucher proposals. The
advocacy behind them has also been persistent and quite impressive. When
legislation is introduced in a particular state, it is invariably accompanied
by supportive articles put forward by the local free-market think tank, as well
as by influential national groups.
Equally impressive have been the results, as evidenced by the recent
adoption of neovouchers in Georgia,
Iowa, and Rhode Island. Lawmakers in Arizona,
Florida, and Pennsylvania have also amended their older
neovoucher policies. They have raised contribution caps per donor, increased
overall tax-credit annual-contribution ceilings, and expanded eligibility
rules. This growth has far outpaced legislative interest in gathering
information about the impact of these programs, which makes systematic empirical
investigation of the policies’ weaknesses and strengths virtually impossible.
***
Some recipients of neovouchers undoubtedly have more educational
options than would otherwise be the case. But we don’t know how many such
students there are, whether or not neovouchers more efficiently provide such
enhanced choices than other policy options would, or what the educational
outcomes are for students who do use neovouchers. What is knowable now,
however, is that neovouchers move policy away from democratic control over
education, and from a societal commitment to public schooling. This, for me, is
a real concern.
Opponents of neovouchers have attacked the policy as “money
laundering,” “a shell game,” and “back-door vouchers.” And the obfuscation of
public expenditures by neovoucher legislation does deserve a closer look. But
the value of neovoucher policies will ultimately depend on how well they
accomplish our shared educational goals. Unless and until the neovoucher states
require the collecting and reporting of meaningful data, all we really have is
one more riddle: Why would advocates of a wonderful reform try to shield its
results from public view?
Kevin G. Welner, an education
researcher, is an associate professor and director of the Education and the Public Interest
Center at the University
of Colorado at Boulder. He is the author of NeoVouchers: The Emergence of
Tuition Tax Credits for Private Schooling, to be published this month by
Rowman & Littlefield.
Vol.
28, Issue 02, Pages 27,32